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Abstract- A stable electricity supply is vitalfor modern society.
However, many parts of our power transmission grid are operating
near their operational limits. Such stressed systems are vulnerable
to cascading failures, where a few small faults can induce a
cascade of failures potentially leading to a major blackout. The
Unified Power Flow Controller (UPFC), the most powerful highspeed, semi-conductor based power flow device, can be used as
a theoretical model to study how these devices can be used to
improve power grid resilience. The blueprint presented here can be
used to iteratively identify critical weaknesses in power grids and to
recommend a means offixing these weaknesses via the installation
of UPFCs. This approach to hardening the power transmission grid
will make it less prone to blackouts and better able to forestall or
reduce the severity of unavoidable blackouts.
Keywords: Critical Infrastructure Protection, Power Grid,
FACTS, UPFC, Evolutionary Algorithm
1 Introduction

Modern industrialized society has become dependent on
electric power. In fact, in a report to the President of the
United States, the U.S. Department of Energy said "Electricity
is a cornerstone on which the economy and the daily lives
of our nation's citizens depend. This essential commodity
has no substitute" [7]. Not only does electric power directly
provide heating, lighting and the power that drives manufacturing plants, but it is also a vital resource on which other
infrastructures, including water distribution, sewage treatment
and removal, emergency services, and traffic flow control,
rely. Unfortunately, power grids all over the world are facing
conditions which may jeopardize their ability to satisfy future
demand for power as well as making them a target for terrorist
attack.
Electric power is produced at large generating facilities and
then "transmitted" over a system known as the transmission
grid to regional distribution systems. The transmission grid,
which consists of many long-distance, high-voltage lines and
the buses to which they are connected, is really at the heart of
the electric power industry. The transmission grid is the fundamental link between power producers and consumers, and,
unfortunately, is becoming increasingly overburdened. Over
the past decade demand for electricity has steadily increased
and deregulation has spurred increased power transfers, but
due to environmental, economic, and social concerns, the
transmission grid has had relatively few upgrades. As a result,
many of the components are operating near their intended
capacity. Prior to deregulation a top-down approach could be
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used to distribute power evenly through the entire system,
however, due to deregulation there is incentive for transmission
operators to operate as near capacity as possible. This allows
o
operator
to
e anrcapct as possiblets al
excess power to be purchased from distant markets, but at
the expense of reduced system stability margins. For the
foreseeable future the power industry will be able to produce
enough power to meet customer demands, however, the current
transmission grid may be operating so close to its limits that

coudcaueawblacutw[7].
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Transmission grids have two features which

make them
prone to catastrophic failure. First, because transmission lines
often cross vast, unmonitored space, they are susceptible to
both natural failures (ice, wind damage, tree contact) and
intentional disruption (terrorist attack). Second, when a transmission line fails, the power which it was carrying flows over
other lines. In a system where many components are already
operating near their limits, the additional demands following
a failure can cause other components to fail. The induced
failures can, in turn, induce additional failures that eventually
lead to a domino effect that causes a blackout.
Power flow in the transmission grid today is largely dictated
by Ohm's laws: power flows along the path of least resistance.
Historically, the flow of power has been controlled by adjust-

ing where the power is being generated and by "compensating"
the lines, where electromechanical devices physically add or
remove components to change line impedances. Although
this was satisfactory when the grid was operating well below its maximum capacity, as the grid becomes increasingly
overburdened it becomes vital to have better control over
the flow of power to help mitigate cascading outages by
directing power flow away from components that are near
their failure point. By using automatic control algorithms and
high-speed, accurate power flow control in key locations, it
may be possible to mitigate or at least reduce the severity of
cascading outages. Having this additional control may also be
a vital element for defending power systems against deliberate
physical and cyber attack.
The power grid is considered to be a significant target for
terrorist attack because, due to its large scale, it is susceptible
to a number of different attacks including: physical destruction
of lines, physical control of a substation or generating facility,
and cyber attacks on control and communication systems. Due
to the sheer size of the system it is impossible to effectively
protect all the physical components, and due to the complex

control interactions of the different companies and components weight causing it to break, much like a fuse. Either of these
in the system a comprehensive cyber defense is also infeasible. failures is due to carrying above average current for a sustained
In addition to being vulnerable, the power grid makes a period (several seconds to hours). Sagging into trees was the
tantalizing terrorist target due to the havoc that follows even most significant contributor to the North American blackout
a short disruption. This was particularly evident following the of 2003 [7]. In that case, failure to maintain properly trimmed
August 2003 blackout that effected a significant region of trees, rather than excessive line sag, was the major cause of
North America. In addition to the financial losses incurred due failure.
to business closings, a number of vital services including 911
UPFCs are studied here primarily because they offer a
service, sewage treatment, and water service were lost due comprehensive means of power flow control, being able to
to their reliance on electricity. Moreover, there is evidence control both real and reactive power flow as well as being
that grid attacks are actively being investigated by terrorist able to regulate bus voltage. UPFCs have a total of twelve
organizations. In a statement to the joint subcommittee of the different forms of control [8] and represent a super set of
House of Representatives, Christopher Cox, a representative the capabilities of other devices in the FACTS family as well
from the state of California, reported that "Al-Qaida computers as high speed versions of more traditional electromechanical
seized in Afghanistan in 2001 had logged on to sites offering means of control. For the work proposed here, the ideal control
that offer [sic] software and programming instructions for mode is unknown a priori, and, more importantly, may be
the distributed control systems (DCS) and Supervisory-control different for different system vulnerabilities. I.e., under one
and Data-acquisition (SCADA) systems that run power, water, type of failure the UPFCs may be best used for power flow
transport and communications grids. [6]"
regulation and in another scenario additional voltage support
may be more important. A theoretical UPFC provides an ideal
model of control capabilities because, with the appropriate
In an effort to help better control power flow, the Electric control algorithm, it can seamlessly change control modes
Power Research Institute (EPRI) sponsored an initiative to to suit the current situation. The plan presented here can be
develop a new class of power control devices called Flexible used to indicate where system vulnerabilities exist and further
AC Transmission System (FACTS) devices. These devices, studies can easily identify the specific form of device (UPFC,
which are based on recent improvements in semi-conductor other FACTS, or traditional means) to provide the best cost
technology, can be used to help solve a variety of power con- benefit for system defense.
trol problems. By using the latest semi-conductor technology, 1 2
Using UPFCs for Critical Infrastructure Protection
these devices are able to control AC power in a substantially
new way which is both faster and more precise than previous
The remainder of the paper looks at three inter-connected
problems: 1) identifying the kinds of attacks the power grid
techniques.
One of the most powerful forms of FACTS device is the is susceptible to, 2) finding installation locations that allow a
Unified Power Flow Controller (UPFC). As its name suggests, few UPFCs to substantially reduce the likelihood of cascading
its primary role is to provide control over power flow. A UPFC failures, and 3) modeling the elements necessary to simulate
is installed on a specific power line and provides almost total both simple cascading failures and the control capabilities
control over the power flowing through that line. Due to the of UPFCs. Each of these topics alone presents a complex
nature of electric power flow, increasing or decreasing the flow problem and the approach presented here is not intended to
through one line has an ancillary effect on the lines to which be a panacea to solve all power grid vulnerabilities. Instead,
it is connected. This allows a single UPFC to have significant a simplistic approach is outlined to explore the feasibility and
impact: it can be used to increase power flow through a line potential impact of the use of FACTS devices for a specific
and potentially draw excess power away from "upstream" lines type of system vulnerability. Following the feasibility study,
that are operating over capacity, or it can restrict power flow detailed analysis can be performed to determine the realand reduce the load on "down stream" lines. Due to high world applicability of the results. Essentially the technique
installation cost it is impractical to install more than a few can be used to provide some recommended solutions to a
UPFCs in a system, but a few devices cooperatively using their very complicated problem, which system engineers can then
ancillary impact may provide enough regulation to redirect evaluate and refine.
The approach presented here is based on a game-theory
power flow and avoid or at least reduce the overload on critical
lines.
model of attackers and defenders and requires iterative cycles
Although UPFCs can be used to mitigate a variety of of simulated attacks. As such, a power system simulation that
operating conditions, the work here focuses on finding ways models the most significant features of both cascading failures
to relieve or at least reduce the severity of cascading outages. and UPFCs is required. The simulation will be used in two
The most significant cascading outages are a direct result ways: the first will identify the attacks to which the system
of transmission lines carrying higher-than-normal amounts of is highly vulnerable and the second is used to find ways for
current, which causes the metal to expand and sag. A failure UPFCs to mitigate the attacks. By repeating the two cycles
occurs when the line either sags into contact with a ground it will be possible to incrementally harden the system against
source, such as a tree, or weakens to the point of its own the most probable attacks and failures.

2 Iterative Hardening
The proposed technique for identifying system vulnerabilities and potential ways to rectify them is based on a basic
game theory approach similar to that proposed in [1]. In this
approach, two distinct games are played: one by an attacker
and one by a defender.
2.1 The Attacker's Game

The goal of the attacker's game is to identify the brittle
areas in the network. The actual goal of the attacker is to cause
the most damage with the least effort. Ideally the attacker will
select a few lines that will cause a total blackout. The attacker's
game can be thought of as a simple discrete maximization
problem, such as:
arg max F (0, Q) -F (a, Q) + G (a, )

(1)

that exhibit these properties. EAs are loosely based on the concept of Darwinian evolution. Problem solutions are encoded in
individuals (in our case a list of line outages). A population of
several individuals is "evolved" by iteratively applying a fixed
cycle of evolutionary operations. At each iteration, the fitness
of all members of the population is determined by measuring
how good each member is relative to the others using (1).
The evolutionary operators are: (1) selecting individuals for
reproduction with a bias towards fitter individuals, (2) applying
variation mechanisms inspired by biological systems such as
recombination (implements II) and mutation (implements I),
(3) selecting individuals to survive to the next cycle from the
combined "adult" individuals and their offspring, with a bias
towards fitter individuals, The evolutionary cycle continues
until a suitable termination condition has been achieved, such
as

reaching a performance plateau.

2.2 The Defender's Game

where:
is the attack plan, a schedule of what lines to remove
and when to remove them
is a set of parameters for the power system, including
/3
load profiles
F(a, Q) is a function that simulates the power system and
determines the total amount of power delivered
G(a, Q) is a reward function for encouraging the simpler
attacks. Q is included so that parameters of the power
system, such as line length and location, may be used
evaluate the complexity.
The term F (0, Q) - F (a, Q) measures the amount of power
delivery lost due to the attack. The reward function, G(a, 3)
may also be dependent on the degree of power loss, so a three
step plan may be preferred to a two step plan if the increase in
damage is substantial. This maximization problem represents
the typical intent of a malicious attack (maximal damage with
minimal effort). (Note that the value of F (0, Q) is constant)
Power system parameters and operating conditions are
nearly impossible to predict in advance, so the game can either
assume that: 1) the attacker will try to take advantage of a peak
load time and assume a specified worst case Q, or 2) that 3
can be considered a random variable and, at the expense of
considerably more computation, the expectation can be used:
a

arg max E [F (0, Q)

-

F (a, Q) + G (a,

3)]

(2)

Exhaustive search can be used to find the most significant
attacks on small systems, but unfortunately the problem search
.......
.
' .
space grows exponentially with the attack size, so it is in'
feasible for large systems. At this time, there are no efficient
.
'
problem; however,
techniques known for optimal search of this
some important observations can be made: 1) It is expected
that changing a single element of an attack may make the
attack incrementally better, but there is no known method of
identifying which change is optimal without exhaustive search
and 2) It is expected that mixing elements of two good attacks
may yield a better attack
A technique known as an Evolutionary Algorithm (EA) is an
ideal candidate for searching large combinatorial search spaces

Since the end goal is to demonstrate that UPFCs can defend
the system against the weaknesses identified by the attacker,
the defender's goal is to minimize the system's brittleness,
which can also be expressed as a discrete maximization
problem:
(3)
argmax E [F (a,3) + H (Q3)]

Where H(Q) is a reward function that encourages using as
few UPFCs as possible, the expectation is taken over a set of
likely attacks, and only the components of 3 that correspond
to UPFC locations can be changed. By maximizing (3), the
defender is selecting places to install UPFCs that maximize
the amount of power delivered over all the attacks to which
the system was the most vulnerable.
The set of potential attacks will be taken directly from the
best solutions to the Attacker's Game, and the probability of
their incidence can be based on the same ranking used by
the attacker (their complexity, G (a, )) or may assume that
the probability of attack is related to the amount of damage
incurred (F (0, Q) - F (a, Q)). The latter corresponds to a
mini-max game, where the defender minimizes the damage
done by the attacker's best possible attacks.
Selecting installation locations for UPFCs is also a combinatorial problem with no known, optimal solution, but, as
and combination of
with selecting
goo
souin attacks,
.a'ilrandom
bte variation
ouin,so
gi,a Ai
'.
. ' '
.
.
a good mechanism to select installation configurations. This
assumes that all the installed UPFCs operate optimally with
~~~~respect
Sectioto3.3.the performance criteria, which will be covered in
23
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Defending against a single attack alone does not provide
any significant improvement in fault tolerance if there are
other attacks of nearly equal complexity and damage. The
real goal is to demonstrate that a few well placed UPFCs can
substantially harden power grids.
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The first four criteria can be met via modification to a
traditional power system technique known as Loadflow. The
\fifth criteria is subjective, however the form of simulation
presented here is based on common analysis techniques used
by power engineers to determine system faults and is one of
the most likely starting places for a vulnerability assessment.
Moreover, all the information required for this type of attack
simulation would be readily available to a potential attacker.

3.1 Power System Steady-State Model
The most straight forward approach to steady-state power
system simulation is a technique known as Loadflow. Loadflow
models
a power system asoe
a collection
of buses,
be
eihragnrtr
csoe,o
oh which
n can
e
either
a
a
or
and
power
generator,
customer,
both,
of poe lie oncigtebse oehr tec a set
u

The attacker's EA is designed to find the simplest significant
faults, while the defender's EA is designed to install the fewest
number ofrdevices
number
of devices necessary
necessary to
to significantly hardn
harden te
the ggrid
aganstthoe
ataks.Sine
ttakers coies
against those
attacks.
Since te
the attacker's
choices will change
based on the system configuration, these two algorithms need
to be run in an iterative cycle to incrementally improve the there are four state variables, and, depending on the specific
combination of generators and power consumers at the bus,
system.
two
of the state variables are known and the other two are
The attacker's algorithm will provide an adequate source
unknown.
Loadflow is merely a technique that solves for the
of attacks for each potential system configuration, while the
unknown
state
variables. The four state variables are:
defender's algorithm will continually improve the system
rea
Pi
the real power load at bus j
defenses in order to escalate the complexity of significant
Qj, the reactive power load at bus j
attacks. As such, it is expected that both the reward functions
ve,j the real component of the voltage at bus j, Re{Vj}
will need to be "cooled" as the two algorithms alternate back
Vh,j the reactive component of voltage at bus j,
and forth to allow for increasingly complicated attacks and
Imag{§V }
increasing numbers of FACTS installations. Fig. 1 shows a
flow chart of the sequence in which the two algorithms will Note that the voltage is a sinusoidal signal and can be
be used and Fig. 2 shows the basic data flow.
represented in polar form with a magnitude, VE l, and a phase
angle (relative to a reference bus), ZVj. For the version of
3 Simulation
Loadflow used here the voltage is converted to rectangular
An accurate simulation of the power system, represented form, Ve,j + Vhj. There are three types of buses in the system,
by the function F(a,/3) above, is vital in order to achieve and the type of bus indicates which variables are known and

illchagebe

delellder~
~~~~~~~~~~h
~~~

meaningful results. To be useful, the simulation must:
1) Be fast enough for repeated evaluations needed by a BA
2) Be able to simulate line failures
3) Be able to simulate all twelve UPFC control modes as
well as install and remove UPFCs

powertN

loll athul buso

which are unknown:
Generator Buses are directly connected to a large generator. It is assumed that the power, Pj, and voltage, vj, at these
buses is constant due to the generator. The reactive power
supplied by the generator, Qj, and the phase angle of the

voltage, &j, are unknown. Note that there are practical limits
on the amount of reactive power a generator can supply, which
are enforced by the simulation described here.
Load Buses represent the bulk of the buses in a system,
which have a known real power load, Pj, and a known reactive
power load, Qj. Generally these represent the load being used
by customers but may also represent power being injected into
the system that cannot be explicitly represented as a generator
(discussed later). The voltage, vj, and phase angle of the
voltage, 6j, are unknown.
The Slack Bus is a special generator in the system which
is used: 1) as a reference against which all other phase angles
are measured (Q, = 0 by definition), and 2) as a supply for
additional real power to make up for system losses. At all
other buses a known power is either injected or withdrawn,
however the power lines themselves require power to operate.
The slack bus represents a "free" source of real power (the
slack) to make up for the power consumed by the transmission
system itself, known as system losses.
Power systems are governed by Kirchhoff's power laws,
which ensure that the sum of the power at a bus is zero. I.e., the
power that enters the bus must also leave the bus. Kirchhoff's
laws for an AC transmission grid can be represented as one set
of equations for the real component of power and a second set
for either the reactive component or voltage depending on the
type of bus. All buses except the slack bus must have balanced
real power:
buses

Pi

-ve,j

E3 (gi,kVe,k - bj,kVh,k)
k

buses
Vh,j E (gj,kVh,k + bj,kVe,k)
k

Qbusvesj

0

(4)

(Yj,kVh,k + bj,kVe,k)
bj,kVe,k)
Qj +Ve,j 1:
E (gi,kVh,k

1
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Fig. 3. The Newton-Raphson Loadflow Estimation Process
Since each bus has an equation for real power (Pj) and
either an equation for reactive power (Qj) or an equation for
voltage magnitude ( Vj ), there are a total of 2N quadratic
equations and 2N unknowns for a system with N buses.
The system of equations is generally solved via the NewtonRaphson method, which uses the first-order Taylor series
approximation of (4), (5), and (6) to iteratively update an
estimate of the values of the unknown variables.
The Newton-Raphson method starts with an initial guess of
state variables, which is either based on a prior known state
or specified nominal values. The iterative process then updates
within an appropriate error tolerance.
A basic Loadflow algorithm which relies on the NewtonRaphson technique is shown in Fig. 3. The Newton-Raphson
technique is commonly used in power systems for a variety
of reasons:
are

(Yj,kVe,k

-

bj,kVh,k)

0

(5)

k

while the generator buses have a constant voltage:

V- (v2

gj,k

or Nominal Values

these values until the error in the equalities of (4), (5), and (6)

+

bLses
+Vh,J

Initialize State Variables to Best Guess

+v

0

(6)

the conductance from bus j to bus k
bj,k the susceptance from bus j to bus k
Note that subscript e indicates the real component of a
complex variable and the subscript h indicates the imaginary
component of a complex variable. (4) assures everything but
the slack bus meets Kirchhoff's law for real power. (5) ensures
that load buses meet Kirchhoff's law for reactive power as
well, while (6) ensures that generators, which generate an
unknown amount of reactive power and thus violate (5),
operate at a fixed voltage,

1) State variables are generally close to either a known or
a nominal value, so it is easy to select an "initial guess"
for state variables,
2) the technique generally has quadratic convergence, and
hence only requires a few iterations,
3) the power flow equations are sinusoidal in nature and
are well behaved with regard to minor perturbations,
4) in the Newton-Raphson method, the power flow equations are a sparse, linear system and the underlying
techniques, such as using LU decomposition, are computationally efficient.
Generators produce both real power, which can be used for real
work, and a form of oscillating power called reactive power.

Reactive power is a vital component of AC power systems
and may be either consumed or produced by the power lines
themselves, as well as by generators or customers. As power
lines fail, other lines begin to transfer the excess power and
may require additional reactive power to do so. The generators
in the system both produce or consume reactive power to
ensure that the total reactive power in the system is balanced,
however each generator has a limit on the amount of reactive
power it can supply or absorb. Since reactive power demands
change as the system loading changes during outages, it is
vital to be able to honor the reactive generation limits of the
system's generators. A common method to enforce these limits
is to monitor the reactive power each generator is supplying
on each iteration of the Newton-Raphson loop. If a generator
exceeds either the minimum or maximum reactive generation
limit, the generator bus is changed to a load bus with Pj set
to correspond to the power injected by the generator, Qj set
to correspond to the maximum amount of reactive power that
the generator can absorb or consume depending on which limit
was exceeded and the voltage. The voltage vj then becomes
an unknown variable.

3.2 Detecting and Enforcing Convergence
As lines are removed from the system, two significant
problems may occur, either of which can prevent traditional
Loadflow techniques from working: islanding and exceeding
system capacity.
Islanding is where separate "islands" develop which effectively separate the system into multiple independent systems.
Typically when this occurs at least one of the newly formed
systems will be unable to meet the equality constraints. There
are three possible cases: 1) islands that lack a swing bus and
have no mechanism to compensate for the real-power losses in
the lines, 2) islands that have load but no generation can not
satisfy customer demand, and 3) islands that have generation
but no load have a surplus of power with no consumers.
Islanding can be easily detected and corrected via graph
traversal. A simple mechanism starts from an arbitrary bus and
recursively visits all unvisited buses to which it is connected,
marking each as visited. If, upon completion, any unvisited
buses exist then the visited group represents a new island,
and the process is repeated with the first unvisited bus. This
process is repeated until all nodes are assigned to islands.
When complete, islands with only generators or only loads
are discarded. Any remaining islands that lack a slack bus are
modified so that the largest generator in each becomes a slack
bus.
Exceeding capacity is when the system is not physically
able to transmit power in a way that satisfies all the constraints
(the power flow constraints of (4), (5), and (6) as well as the
generator reactive limits).
In many cases the constraint equations cannot be met
because the system no longer has the physical ability to carry
enough power to satisfy the load being demanded. When this
happens the original assumptions about the known variables
are incorrect and no values of state variables can meet the

constraint equations, so the original assumptions on load and
generation must be changed to bring the system back to a
solvable state. In systems losing transmission facilities the
most common problem is having a load bus who's lines can
not carry enough power to satisfy the specified demand, Pj.
To bring the system back to a solvable state some of the load
must be shed (reduce Pj). In the framework devised here, the
attackers must assume, as in typical min-max game theory,
that the defender will make optimal choices with the resources
available. Thus ideally both the attackers and defenders will
assume that only the minimum amount of load necessary will
be shed to bring the system back to a solvable state.
A mechanism for optimal updates of the state variables,
which can also be used to detect an ill-conditioned system,
was proposed in [2]. The authors noticed that, when using the
rectangular formulation of power flow as given previously, the
complete Taylor series expansion only requires three terms.
Moreover, these terms have a particularly efficient form and,
most importantly, an exact solution can be found via the
use of an appropriately chosen scalar multiplier. The optimal
multiplier is easy to compute and provides a substantial
improvement in system solvability.

In [3], Overbye notes that the solvable region of the state
space is separated from the unsolvable region by a border
on which the Jacobian used in the Newton-Raphson process
becomes singular. When the system is solvable, the optimal
multiplier remains near unity. Overbye also shows that infeasible systems can be detected by monitoring the magnitude of
the optimal multiplier [3] . When it is sufficiently small, no
state assignments will be able to satisfy the load demands of
the system and load shedding must be performed.
In [4], an extension of [3], a technique was proposed to
bring the system back to an optimal solvable point with a load
shedding technique that maximizes the amount of demand that
can be met. This optimal load shedding relies on the use of
the optimal multiplier technique to bring unsolvable systems
back to the solvable boundary.
Although this optimal form of load shedding may not
be in use on a given power system, it is unlikely that an
attacker would know the exact load shedding capabilities
and procedures, so they would assume a conservative case.
By using the optimal load shedding, the attacker's mini-max
perception, i.e., that the system will be as well defended as
possible, is maintained.

33 UPFC Model
A perfect model of a UPFC consists of a voltage source
connected to a bus in shunt and another voltage source
connected in series with a line. The only constraints imposed
on the model are the magnitude of the shunt voltage source,
which is typically near the magnitude of the source bus, and
that the real power injected or consumed by the series source
must be supplied by the shunt source, which ensures there is
no net real power injected into the system.
The typical UPFC model has twelve unique forms of
control and typical Loadflow implementations assume that

one particular mode will be used [8]. In the plan presented
here, the desired control mode is unknown and may change
depending on the conditions of the system, so a simpler model
is used in which the shunt voltage, series voltage, and series
phase angle are specified directly. The shunt phase angle is left
free to ensure that the shunt can meet the power consumption
demands of the series source.
The UPFC model used here is novel in two respects: 1)
it does not assume the control mode, allowing for the UPFC
to change operating modes in different simulated scenarios to
achieve optimal control for each, and 2) the rectangular coordinate system is used to comply with the optimal multiplier
method, which is used to allow for optimal load shedding.
The optimal settings for the UPFCs can be found via simple
optimization of a metric that will ensure maximal power
delivery prior to failure. Prior work has shown that sequential
quadratic programming is sufficient to directly find UPFC
settings for a simpler model [5], however it is expected that
the same technique will apply to this more general model.

3.4 Line Failure
Line failures, the prime component of cascading outages,
occur because of excessive current overheating power lines,
which eventually sag to the point that they either contact a
ground source or physical failure. A simple line model has
two parameters for each line: 1) a maximum current rating
which it can safely carry and 2) a maximum ampacity, or
cumulative current, that can be carried when the current rating
is exceeded. The time until a line fails can be calculated
based on the results of the Loadflow. For each line which
is exceeding its current rating, the failure time is the amount
of "remaining ampacity" divided by the current through the
line. The "remaining ampacity" continually diminishes until
either the line fails, or the line is no longer exceeding capacity
and has had suitable time to "cool" to relieve the excess heat
generated.

3.53.5
Smlto
Simulation

Ovriw2005.
Overview

The full power system simulation overview can be seen in
Fig. 4. As can be seen, there are a variety of nested loops for
selecting optimal UPFC settings, removing naturally failing
lines, and removing attacked lines. In addition, the Loadflow
itself is a loop performing a significant amount of computation.
4 Conclusions and Future Work

By combining a simplistic UPFC model, which is amenable
to optimal control, with a simulation that is capable of simulating the power system's state as components fail, a simple
line failure estimate, and EAs, It should be possible to provide
a rudimentary plan for significantly improving the robustness
of power grids. EAs will use the simulation to both identify
and repair weaknesses in the system. This combined approach

uses the super set of functionality provided by a general model
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Fig. 4. Power System Simulation for Cascading Failures
the basic ideas presented are sound. Future work will focus
on utilizing more realistic models of the UPFC and qualitative
analysis of the results.
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